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Abstract
The concept of fully homomorphic encryption has been considered the
\holy grail" of cryptography since the discovery of secure public key
cryptography in the 1970s. Fully homomorphic encryption allows arbi-
trary computation on encrypted data to be performed securely. Craig
Gentry's new method of bootstrapping introduced in 2009 provides a
technique for constructing fully homomorphic cryptosystems.
In this paper we explore one such bootstrappable system based on sim-
ple integer arithmetic in a manner that someone without a high level
of experience in homomorphic encryption can readily understand. Fur-
ther, we present an implementation of the system as well as a lattice-
based attack. We present performance results of our implementation
under various parameter choices and the resistance of the system to
the lattice-based attack under those parameters. Unfortunately, while
the system is very interesting from a theoretical point of view, the
results show that it is still not feasible for use.
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Chapter 1
Background
The notion of a \privacy homomorphism" was rst proposed in 1978 by
Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos in [18]; it is highly likely that the question
was raised partly due to the multiplicative homomorphism of the RSA cryp-
tosystem published earlier that same year in [19]. The concept of a privacy
homomorphism is what is known today as a fully homomorphic cryptosystem.
This refers to a cryptosystem that preserves both addition and multiplica-
tion, or the algebraic structure of an abstract ring, across the encryption
function. In such a system, arbitrary algebraic functions can be performed
on a collection of ciphertexts in a way that corresponds to performing the
same operations on the plaintexts.
1.1 Requirements
In order to discuss any homomorphic cryptosystem, we need an understand-
ing of what makes a homomorphic system dierent from a generic cryptosys-
tem. Any cryptosystem has three algorithms dened:
1. Key generation, which takes a desired security level and outputs a
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private/public key pair (sk; pk) for an asymmetric cryptosystem, or
a secret key sk for a symmetric cryptosystem.
2. Encryption, which takes a plaintext m and a (public) key pk and out-
puts a ciphertext c. We designate this by c = E (m).
3. Decryption, which takes a ciphertext c and secret key sk, and outputs
the corresponding plaintext m. We designate this with m = D (c).
For any system, decryption must invert encryption; that is, D (E (m)) must
be the same plaintext as m. However, multiple unique ciphertexts may be
returned by E for a given plaintext. A cryptosystem that does so is called
probabilistic, and only such a system can be semantically secure, as proposed
by Goldwasser and Micali in [11]. Semantic security is equivalent to ciphertext
indistinguishability, which states that an attacker, if given two plaintexts a
ciphertext obtained by encrypting one of them and the public key used to
perform the encryption, cannot determine with probability greater than one-
half (the probability of a random guess) which plaintext corresponds to the
ciphertext.
A homomorphic cryptosystem has these three algorithms, and adds to them
a fourth: the Evaluate algorithm. This takes in a t-tuple of ciphertexts
c = hc1; : : : ; cti, the public key pk that the resulting ciphertext is to be
encrypted under and a function or circuit C that takes t inputs. The Evalua-
tion algorithm outputs a ciphertext corresponding to the application of C to
the ciphertexts c. The strength of homomorphic encryption comes from the
fact that the Evaluate function transfers operations in the plaintext space to
corresponding operations in the ciphertext space.
Denition 1 (Correct Homomorphic Decryption). A cryptosystem with en-
cryption function E and decryption function D is correct for a given t-input
circuit C if the following holds: For any t plaintext bits m = hm1; : : : ;mti
and corresponding ciphertexts c = hc1 : : : ; cti, where ci = E (mi), Dc =
C(m1; : : : ;mt) where c is the output of the Evaluate algorithm given the
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ciphertexts c and circuit C.
A system that is correct for every circuit in some class C of circuits is said
to be homomorphic for the class C. A system that is correct for all Boolean
circuits is called fully homomorphic.
This denition for what makes a cryptosystem homomorphic is largely useful,
but it has one important weakness; it is satised by trivial systems where
the Evaluate algorithm simply appends a description of the circuit C to the
collection of ciphertexts, and leaves the actual computation to the decrypting
party to perform on the decrypted plaintexts. Since this defeats the purpose of
a homomorphic cryptosystem, we want an additional requirement to exclude
these trivial solutions. The way we do this is by requiring that the size of
the output of the Evaluate algorithm is bounded by some polynomial f(),
independent of the size of the circuit C.
1.1.1 Bootstrapping
The major breakthrough for fully homomorphic encryption was the notion
of bootstrapping, presented by Craig Gentry in his 2009 PhD thesis,[8]. The
bootstrapping technique transforms a somewhat homomorphic system into a
fully homomorphic one as long as the decryption process can be expressed as
a Boolean circuit small enough to to be evaluated homomorphically by the
system.
More formally, take a cryptosystem with decryption function D expressed as
a Boolean circuit. Then for any Boolean gate g, we form a new circuit:
Denition 2 (Augmented Decryption Circuit). The g-augmented decryp-
tion circuit for a Boolean gate g with n inputs is the circuit formed by joining
n copies of the decryption circuit D with the gate g; the output of each copy
of D leads to a separate input of g.
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The act of decrypting a ciphertext homomorphically in essence \recrypts" the
ciphertext. That is, it provides a new ciphertext c^ for any given ciphertext
c, such that D (c) = D (c^) = m, with the advantage that the new ciphertext
c^ is fresh, as if it has had no operations applied to it previously.
From this, we have what it means to be a bootstrappable system. A cryp-
tosystem is bootstrappable with respect to some set   of gates if it correctly
evaluates the g-augmented decryption circuit for every gate g 2  . Then any
circuit C made up of gates in  , no matter how large, can be evaluated by
replacing every gate in C with the corresponding augmented decryption cir-
cuit and evaluating the resulting circuit. Therefore, a cryptosystem which is
bootstrappable with respect to some functionally complete set of operations
(e.g. logical AND, XOR and constant TRUE) would be fully homomorphic.
One key point to make about bootstrapping is that performing the bootstrap-
ping process itself involves an encrypted version of the private key. Thus, one
can set up a chain of n keys, with each private key being encrypted by the
next public key in the chain, and use these to evaluate a circuit requiring
at most n levels of bootstrapping. If a secret key remains secure after be-
ing encrypted with its corresponding public key | that is, if knowing that
a given ciphertext corresponds to a secret key sk using the corresponding
public key pk oers no additional information about sk | then arbitrarily
many bootstrapping procedures may be made using only the one key. This
property is known as circular security for the key sk, and is generally taken
to be true though formally proving such tends to be dicult.
1.2 Applications
Since the original proposal of the concept of fully homomorphic encryption
by Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos, a number of uses for fully homomor-
phic systems have been proposed. The general concept behind all of them
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is fairly straightforward: some sort of data/information is encrypted for pri-
vacy/security reasons, while still allowing third parties to manipulate the
encrypted data in a meaningful way. One general case is the outsourcing of
processing sensitive data to a third party. The third party, usually one with
extensive computing resources, has to be able to properly process the data,
but should not be able to tell what it has processed. Some applications only
require homomorphism over either addition or multiplication; others require
both: a fully homomorphic system.
1.2.1 Multi-Party Communication
The problem of secure multi-party communication results when two or more
parties wish to know the value of some function where each party has one
input to the function without revealing their own data to the others. Put more
simply, in a group of n users, each user i knows piece of information mi. The
secure multi-party problem arises when they want to combine their knowledge
in some way, f(m1; : : : ;mn) while keeping each individual mi private.
Millionaire Problem
One of the most prominent examples of such a problem is the millionaire
problem proposed by Andrew Yao in [23]. Two millionaires, Alice and Bob,
wish to know which of them is richer without revealing their actual worths
to each other. Yao proposed a solution with the problem statement, but that
solution takes exponential time and space. A number of protocols to improve
this have been proposed using additively homomorphic cryptosystems as a
base; the protocol described in [16] in particular can use either an additively
or multiplicatively homomorphic system, where the multiplicative systems
incur a somewhat lower computation cost.
5
The millionaire problem can be generalized to comparing a number of dier-
ent values to nd their order, the maximum value and so forth. This leads
readily to the concept of a private auction. If n bidders make bids, then solv-
ing n  1 instances of the millionaire problem reveals who the highest bidder
is, while protecting the privacy of all those involved by keeping their actual
bets secret.
E-Voting
A very large-scale example of an application of homomorphic encryption is
the idea of electronic voting. An ideal voting scheme allows for quick com-
putation of the winner(s) of a vote, while preserving each individual voter's
anonymity. It should also provide some mechanism for verifying that the
count is correctly computed, that each vote is counted as the individual
voter intended, and that no tampering of the votes has occurred. Of course,
not every implementation of the concept will necessarily have all of these
attributes.
The concept of a voting system being receipt free is related to prevent a voter
selling his vote to a third party or being coerced into voting in a particular
way. A receipt free system prevents a voter from proving whom they voted for
to any third party. Thus, an individual voter's choice must be kept secret; the
system enforces this. In [12], Martin Hirt and Kazue Sako present a receipt
free system for 1-out-of-N elections, in which each voter chooses one of N
options to vote for. Hirt and Sako's system relies on having an underlying
encryption scheme that is homomorphic over addition.
Various authors have attempted to improve existing e-voting systems in a
number of ways. For example, [1] explores the use of homomorphic encryp-
tion for elections in which each voter gives an ordered list of preferences,
rather than a simple 1-out-of-N election. They show how homomorphic en-
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cryption can be used for preferential elections, but nd that its eciency
is too low to be used practically, and instead turn to a technique known
as mix-networks. On the other hand, [17], which has some of the same au-
thors, proposes an e-voting system based o of multiplicatively homomorphic
cryptosystems rather than the additively homomorphic systems more com-
monly studied. The goal of using multiplicatively homomorphic systems is
to improve eciency for 1-out-of-N elections.
More Examples
Consider three employees Alice, Bob and Charlie. The three want to know
their average salary, but each wishes to keep their own salary private. That
is, if their salaries are a; b; c respectively, then fully homomorphic encryption
can be used to nd (a + b + c)=3 without revealing the values of a; b or c.
Alice can of course tell whether her own salary is above or below average,
but cannot discern more about Bob's salary or Charlie's salary than knowing
the average would tell her anyway. This concept can again be generalized to
any number of employees greater than two | the system still works with two
employees, but knowing the average salary would reveal the other employee's
salary in that case.
Another example related to homomorphic encryption is the dining cryptogra-
phers problem, a method for anonymous public broadcast among a group of
peers. The dining cryptographers problem is typically presented as a group
of cryptographers seated around a table at a restaurant. They are informed
by a waiter that their bill has been paid in advance, though they are not
told who paid the bill. The cryptographers wish to know if one of them paid
the bill or whether a third party did so, while respecting each individual's
right to make a payment anonymously. The typical solution, appropriately
called the dining cryptographers protocol, uses techniques similar to those
found in (additively) homomorphic encryption to achieve similar goals. Note
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however, that the dining cryptographers protocol uses only one operation, so
fully homomorphic encryption is more powerful than the protocol requires.
1.2.2 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
One useful idea in cryptography is the notion of a zero-knowledge proof.
A zero-knowledge proof is some method where Peggy, the prover, wishes to
prove some statement to Victor, the verier of Peggy's claim, without re-
vealing any other information to Victor. Specically, a zero-knowledge proof
must:
 always convince Victor of Peggy's claim when it it is true
 only convince Victor with some small probability (which can usually
be made arbitrarily small) when Peggy tries to cheat the system
 reveal nothing to Victor other than the fact that Peggy is attempting
to prove
As a related example to the millionaire problem above, suppose Peggy is a
millionaire with m dollars and wishes to prove to Victor that m > 1000000,
that she is in fact a millionaire. Simply revealing to Victor the value of
m would indeed prove to his satisfaction that m > 1000000, but a zero-
knowledge proof would be one in which Victor learns only that m is greater
than one million and nothing more. A solution to the millionaire problem
becomes a simple proof in this case: if Victor pretends to be a millionaire
with exactly one million dollars, then solving the millionaire problem will
reveal that Peggy has more money than Victor without revealing her actual
worth m.
Just as Yao published a solution to his millionaire problem without use of
homomorphic encryption, zero-knowledge proofs can be implemented with-
out homomorphic encryption; the use of homomorphic encryption is not to
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enable zero-knowledge proofs but to improve the eciency with which they
can be performed.
1.2.3 Security in Cloud Computing
The true power of fully homomorphic encryption is that it can be used to
securely compute any Boolean function; some applications can be achieved
with only additive or multiplicative homomorphism, but an arbitrary com-
putation engine must have access to both (or some equivalent ability). This
allows one party, the client, to ooad any computation they want done on
encrypted data to an untrusted third party, a very useful thing to be able to
do.
The act of processing large databases in some manner is a common problem
in the modern, digital era. Companies have customer histories and nancial
records, hospitals and other medical facilities have patients' medical records,
and so on. One growing trend is to outsource the storage and/or processing
of data to external providers in order to save money on the purchasing and
maintenance of large computer systems. Private individuals are increasingly
using so-called cloud computing for the ease of universal access and par-
ticipating in large-scale distributed computation projects such as the Great
Internet Mersenne Prime Search (GIMPS) or the Folding@home project for
understanding protein-related diseases.
One issue with doing so is that the data to be processed may be condential
or otherwise sensitive. For example, hospitals are legally required to preserve
the condentiality of their patients' medical records; even without being re-
quired to keep the data secret, companies may wish to do so for their own
reasons. The application of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem to this prob-
lem allows companies, hospitals and members of the general public to ooad
the processing of sensitive information to untrusted parties.
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Related Challenges
This outsourcing of computations has a number of important challenges re-
lated to it, and a general system must be capable of solving all of them to
the satisfaction of the client. Fully homomorphic encryption is a large piece
of the puzzle, but it only protects one thing: the privacy of the data being
operated on. Other aspects of the client's privacy must be dealt with in other
ways.
Recall that fully homomorphic encryption allows the third party to com-
pute E (f(m1; : : : ;mn)) given Boolean circuit C corresponding to f and the
ciphertexts E (m1) ; : : : ; E (mn). However, the company requesting the data
processing may not wish to reveal even the processing being done; they with
to keep f secret. This concept is known as circuit privacy. Andrew Yao | the
same one to pose the millionaire problem | proposed the idea of garbled cir-
cuits in 1986 [24] as a tool for secure multi-party communication (see section
1.2.1). The garbled circuit construction provides a rudimentary level of cir-
cuit privacy; Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan created a re-randomizable
variant to deal with the problem of evaluating nested functions homomorphi-
cally, that is computing E (g(f(x))) from E (f(x)), called i-hop homomorphic
encryption[10].
The second major issue to consider is the honesty of the computing party. A
client outsourcing their computations can use fully homomorphic encryption
to enable the computing party to evaluate c = E (f(m1; : : : ;mk)) without
compromising the security of fmig. However, this does not guarantee that
the computing party will, in fact evaluate c. A dishonest server could per-
form an unrelated computation and return the result or even return a random
number to the client. Under a paid outsourcing agreement, this eectively
cheats the client out of the agreed-on fee. Distributed computing systems run
into similar issues with individuals trying to claim credit for discoveries they
don't actually perform. The most common protection they implement is to
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withhold credit until independent verication; this technique is vulnerable
to collusion, and wastes resources by performing redundant calculations. A
combination of fully homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits is pre-
sented in [7] to introduce a formal concept of veriable computing as well as
provide an initial solution to the issue.
1.3 A Brief History
1978 RSA published, with unintentional side eect of preserving multipli-
cation across encryption [19]. Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos propose
idea of privacy homomorphisms [18], most likely due to accidental ho-
momorphism of RSA.
1996 Josep Domingo-Ferrer publishes a privacy homomorphism [5].
2000 Brahm Cohen posts a public key system similar to the later van Dijk
system to the internet [4], though this system is not homomorphic as-is.
Hirt and Sako propose their receipt-free voting scheme [12].
2002 Ferrer Publishes another, dierent privacy homomorphism system [6].
2003 Ferrer's system from 2002 is shown to be insecure and breakable [22].
Australia based team investigates use of homomorphic encryption for
preferential elections [1].
2004 A second Australian team, consisting of many of the same members
as the preferential elections paper, proposes a voting scheme based o
of multiplication rather than addition [17].
2005 Dan Boneh, Eu-Jin Goh and Kobbi Nissim publish a partially homo-
morphic cryptosystem [2]. Their system is homomorphic over addition,
as well as a single multiplication.
2006 Ferrer's original 1996 system also shown to be insecure [3].
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2008 Levieil and Naccache publish a system based on an additively homo-
morphic cryptosystem to prevent cheating on exams [15].
2009 Craig Gentry publishes his PhD. thesis, in which he details the tech-
nique of bootstrapping to turn partially homomorphic systems into
fully homomorphic systems [8]. The thesis also includes a lattice-based
system to demonstrate the bootstrapping ideas.
2010 Gentry's techniques are used by van Dijk et al. to create a fully homo-
morphic cryptosystem based o of integer arithmetic [21]. This system
has the advantage of being conceptually easier than Gentry's lattice
system. Gentry's lattice system is rened by Smart and Vercauteren
[20] and implemented with bootstrapping by Gentry and Halevi [9].
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Chapter 2
Underlying Homomorphic
System
Shortly after Gentry's breakthrough paper on bootstrapping, a team con-
sisting of Marten van Dijk of MIT and Gentry, Shai Halevi and Vinod
Vaikuntanathan from IBM Research published a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme based on simple modular arithmetic[21]. Their system has the
advantage of being conceptually easier than the lattice-based system Gentry
advanced in [8]. Their system is similar to a (non-homomorphic) system pro-
posed in 2000 by Bram Cohen[4] and a system from 2008 from Levieil and
Naccache[15] which uses additive homomorphism to prevent students from
cheating on exams.
2.1 Description
The system proposed by van Dijk et al. encrypts a single bit plaintext as
a large integer using a relatively simple arithmetic equation. Let p be a
randomly chosen  bit long odd integer; this is the secret key. Let r be a
13
random integer  bits long, and let q be a random integer such that qp is 
bits long. The variables q and r are ephemeral keys, and need not be retained.
For a plaintext m 2 f0; 1g, set c according to
c = E (m) = pq + 2r + m (2.1)
then c is a  bit ciphertext corresponding to m.
Decryption can be achieved by reversing this process.
m = D (c) = (c mod p) mod 2 (2.2)
Also, since (c mod p) = c   p bc=pc, the decryption formula can be alter-
natively expressed as m = (c mod 2)  (bc=pc mod 2). Note that in their
original paper, van Dijk's team use the closest integer function, bc=pe, which
requires interpreting modulo as  bn=2c < x mod n  bn=2c. For this pa-
per, we use the greatest integer function instead, and interpret modulo as
0  x mod n < n. Doing so eases implementation of the system, while incur-
ring no signicant penalty.
2.1.1 Correctness
Theorem 1. Let m1 and m2 be two one-bit plaintexts, and let c1 = E (m1) =
q1p + 2r1 + m1 and c2 = E (m2) = q2p + 2r2 + m2. Then c1 + c2 is a valid
encryption of m1  m2 and c1c2 is a valid encryption of m1m2, subject to
(2r1 + m1)(2r2 + m2) = 4r1r2 + 2r1m2 + 2r2m1 + m1m2 < p.
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Proof. Expand the sum and product:
c1 + c2 = pq1 + 2r1 + m1 + pq2 + 2r2 + m2
= p(q1 + q2) + 2(r1 + r2) + (m1 + m2)
 2(r1 + r2) + (m1 + m2) (mod p)
and
c1  c2 = (pq1 + 2r1 + m1)(pq2 + 2r2 + m2)
= p2q1q2 + 2pq1r2 + pq1m2
+ 2pq2r1 + 4r1r2 + 2r1m2
+ pq2m1 + 2r2m1 + m1m2
 (2r1 + m1)(2r2 + m2) (mod p)
If (2r1 +m1)(2r2 +m2) < p, then reducing it mod p has no eect, so further
reducing mod 2 retrieves m1m2. Likewise, if 2(r1 + r2) + (m1 + m2) < p,
reducing mod 2 retrieves m1 +m2. However, if either of these is greater than
or equal to p, reducing modulo p can change the parity, so that the reduction
mod 2 gives a dierent value. Thus, the system can evaluate addition correctly
as long as 2(r1 + r2) + (m1 + m2) < p, and it can evaluate multiplication
correctly as long as (2r1 +m1)(2r2 +m2) < p. Since 2(r1 + r2) + (m1 +m2) <
(2r1 + m1)(2r2 + m2), it suces to say that both are correctly evaluated if
(2r1 + m1)(2r2 + m2) < p.
For the purposes of this thesis, all operations are implicitly assumed to remain
within these bounds when the size of the function being evaluated is not
directly relevant.
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Bit Lengths
As seen above, the somewhat homomorphic scheme correctly evaluates both
addition and multiplication, provided that the total noise of the computation
remains less than p. In order to simplify analysis of the system, we use the
length in bits of both the noise and p. The bit length of a number n is equal
to blog nc + 1 (all logarithms in this paper are assumed to be base 2 unless
explicitly specied). As long as the noise is shorter than p, it is also smaller
than p, so the system remains homomorphic.
For a given set of operations to perform on a number of inputs, the eect of
the operations on the length of the noise is easily computed. A single addition
of two ciphertexts has noise equal to the sum of the noises of the summands.
This is equal to the length of the longer noise, plus possibly a single carry
bit. A single multiplication produces noise with length equal to the sum of
the lengths of the noises of the factors.
2.1.2 Completeness
Section 2.1.1 shows that as long as the number of operations performed
remains bounded, the system can properly evaluate any sequence of multi-
plications and additions on a collection of ciphertexts, and the result will
be a valid encryption for the same sequence of multiplications and additions
carried out on the corresponding plaintexts. The only dierence is that the
plaintexts are considered as elements of Z2, and so plaintext addition and
multiplication are considered modulo 2. The next thing to consider is what
types of functions the system can then evaluate.
The primary limitation on what can be evaluated is the limit on function
size seen above. Gentry's bootstrapping technique can be used to remove this
limitation, provided the decryption algorithm for the system can be expressed
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as a function small enough to be correctly evaluated. The application of
bootstrapping to this system will be explored in section 2.3.
Besides the limitation on function size, this system can evaluate any function
composed of multiplication and addition. When considered as operations
over Z2, these correspond to logical AND and XOR, respectively. Further, the
number 1 is a valid, if insecure, encryption of plaintext 1. Thus, the set of
Boolean functions that can be evaluated by this system are those that can
be expressed by logical AND, XOR and constant TRUE. Since these form a
functionally complete set of operations, any Boolean function can be correctly
evaluated by this system. The expression of an arbitrary Boolean function in
terms of AND and XOR may be somewhat larger than expressing the same
function with some other set of gates, though.
2.2 Public Key Version
The system as described above is a symmetric encryption scheme: p is used
for encryption as well as decryption. In order to turn it into a public key
system, we take advantage of the homomorphic nature of the system. Given
a number of ciphertexts c1; : : : ; ck all of which encrypt the plaintext 0, the
sum c1 + : : : + ck is also a valid encryption of zero. Since zero and one are
also valid encryptions of themselves, the sum c1 + : : : + ck + m is a valid
encryption of the plaintext m. This idea becomes the basis for the public key
version of the system.
The private key for the new system remains the integer p, which is odd and
 bits long. The public key consists of a set K of fi integers that are near-
multiples of p. The integers are of the form xi = qip+ri, where r is a random
noise factor  bits long and xi itself is  bits long. Encryption of a plaintext
m is then performed by selecting a random subset S of K, a random noise
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0 bits long, and outputting the ciphertext c according to
c = 2
X
x2S
x + 2r + m
Each x in the public key is of the form qip + ri. The multiplication by 2
turns this into (2qi)p + 2ri, which is a valid encryption of zero. This can be
done all during encryption rather than making each xi a valid encryption of
zero at key generation time. Note that the decryption process can remain
unchanged.
The system described by van Dijk et al. provides an additional space saving
optimization. The public key also includes the number x0 = q0p + r0, gener-
ated the same way as the other xi, with the restrictions that x0 is the largest
element of the public key as well as odd, r0 is even and x0 is never chosen as
an element of S during encryption. Rather, the ciphertext is reduced modulo
x0 during the encryption process, making the actual encryption equation
c =
 
2
X
x2S
x + 2r + m
!
mod x0 (2.3)
This additional modication reduces the size of a ciphertext output by the
encryption algorithm without impacting the other aspects of the system.
2.2.1 Security
The security of the new public key version of the system relies on the diculty
of two number theoretic problems. The rst is the subset sum problem. Given
a set X = fxig and a sum y, is there a subset S  X such that
P
x2S x = y.
An attacker that can solve this problem quickly and knows the value of r in
the encryption c = 2
P
xi + 2r + m can use the solution of the subset sum
problem to determine if some subset of the public key K sums to (c  2r)=2.
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Name Meaning Bound Suggested Value
 security parameter
 length of noise in public key  = !(log ) 
0 length of noise during encryption 0 = !(log ) 2
 length of secret key    ( log2 ) ~O(2)
 length of integers in public key  = !(2 log ) ~O(5)
fi number of integers in public key fi   + !(log )  + 
Parameters Used in Bootstrapping
 precision of elements of y =0
 number of elements in y !(  log )
 size of sparse subset S  y 
Table 2.1: Summary of System Parameters
If it does, then m is equal to zero. Fortunately, the recommended setting
of 0 = 2 makes a brute force search of the noise take exponential time.
Further, the subset sum problem is NP-complete, so that the best known
algorithm for solving it itself takes exponential time.
The second problem is the approximate gcd problem. Given a set of near
multiples of an integer p, that is a set of numbers of the form qp + r, the
problem asks to recover the integer p. A solution to the approximate gcd
problem then recovers the private key to the system from the public key.
As it turns out, provided that fi   + !(log ), this is the easiest attack
against the system. Conversely, decreasing fi appears to make the problem
itself harder. A more detailed analysis of this problem can be found in section
2.4.
2.2.2 Complexity
In any computational venture, the required resources are an important con-
sideration. Thus, we turn our attention to the complexity of the system.
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Space consumption is more straightforward to evaluate, so we look that rst
before examining time complexity.
There are two major size concerns: key size and ciphertext size. By denition,
the size of a ciphertext corresponding to a single bit of plaintext is  bits;
the size of the public key is O(fi) bits. Using the suggested parameters, this
results in a ciphertext of size ~O(5) bits, and public key of size ~O(10) bits.
Even at trivial values of , these both grow rather rapidly. In chapter 4 we
examine how large these get in an actual implementation. We also examine
how reducing the value of  improves them. Furthermore, if bootstrapping is
applied to the system, it increases the size of both ciphertexts and the public
key. Section 6.2 describes the results of our bootstrapping implementation.
Time Complexity
The time complexity of the system is also important to take into consider-
ation. First is key generation. Generating a single integer for the public key
involves generating a  bit integer r, a     bit integer q, multiplying q by
the  bit secret key p, and adding r to the product. This is dominated by
the multiplication. Using the GMP library like we did, for high values of 
this can be accomplished in O(1:4) time. For the full value of  suggested by
[21] this becomes ~O(7), while under our relaxed settings it becomes ~O(4:2).
Now, this must be repeated fi times to generate the entire key, for O(2:4)
time taken total. Again, this expands to ~O(12) under the full value of  and
~O(6:2) under our relaxation. Fortunately, this process only needs to happen
once for each key.
The second concern is for the time taken to encrypt a plaintext. Encryption
involves adding a number of randomly chosen integers from the plaintext,
adding in a noise factor 0 bits long, and taking the modulus with respect
to x0. This is the same as performing modular addition of those public key
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integers chosen, which is linear in the size  of the summands. Then if k
integers from the public key are chosen, the overall time to encrypt a single
bit plaintext is O(k). Now, each addition has the possible eect of increasing
the noise by one bit. Since the noise in each key integer is  and the noise
desired during encryption is 0, then this becomes k = 0 . Since  =  and
0 = 2, k = . Therefore, the encryption takes O() time: ~O(6) under
the original system parameters and ~O(4) under our relaxed parameters.
2.3 Bootstrapping
Gentry's technique of bootstrapping involves homomorphically evaluating
the decryption algorithm. Unfortunately, as described above, the smallest
function that decrypts ciphertexts is a constant factor too large to be homo-
morphically evaluated. Gentry gives in [8] a technique for \squashing" the
decryption circuit of his lattice system to a small enough size to be evalu-
ated; the integer-based system uses a similar idea. By embedding additional
information about the secret key in the public key, we provide a way to \post
process" ciphertexts in a way that makes decryption more ecient. Doing so
has the cost of increasing the size of a ciphertext, as well as introducing the
additional hardness assumption that the extra information embedded in the
public key does not help an attacker break the system.
The bootstrappable construction appends three more parameters: ,  and .
To the public key, add a set of  rational numbers each in the interval [0; 2)
with  bits of precision. Call this set y = hy1; : : : ; yi. The set y must also
be chosen so that it contains a sparse subset S of size  so that
P
y2S y
= 1=p
(mod 2). The secret key is replaced with the subset S.
The bootstrappable system requires some modication to the encryption
algorithm, as well as those for evaluating the addition and multiplication and
the decryption algorithm. For the encryption algorithm, generate a ciphertext
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c from plaintext m according to equation (2.3) as before. In addition, for every
i 2 f1; : : : ;g use yi to create zi = (c  yi) mod 2. Keep only n = dlog e + 3
bits of precision after the binary point for each one. Then the ciphertext is
composed of c together with z = hz1; : : : ; zi. Create the same vector z for
the resultant ciphertext when adding and multiplying ciphertexts.
The decryption algorithm remains largely the same. The original decryption
equation could be expressed as
m = (c mod 2)  (bc=pc mod 2)
Under the bootstrappable system, this can be modied to
m = (c mod 2) 
jX
yi2S
zi
k
(2.4)
That is, the sum is taken over those elements zi with indices matching those
elements yi of y that are in the subset S.
2.4 Approximate GCD
At the heart of the cryptosystem's security is the approximate gcd prob-
lem. The problem itself is to recover an integer p from a number of integers
x1; : : : ; xn all of the form xi = qi + ri for some integers qi and ri. This prob-
lem is exactly the problem of recovering the secret key p from the public key
fx0; x1; : : : ; xfig. Furthermore, if fi   + !(log ), then any attack on the
system can be converted to a solution to the approximate gcd problem in
polynomial time; the means the approximate gcd problem is, in one sense,
the easiest attack against the cryptosystem.
The rst issue in accurately dening the approximate gcd problem is what it
means to be an approximate divisor. The simplied statement asks to recover
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an integer p from a set of integers known to have the form xi = qip + ri. Of
course, any integer at all can be written as x = qp + r for some integer q
and some 0  r < p by the well-known division algorithm. The dierence
is that we also require each ri to be bounded: ri is a -bit integer, so that
0  ri < 2.
Once the noise is bounded, there is still some ambiguity as to the solution
to the approximate gcd problem. After all, any number x is at most 2 above
a multiple of 3, at most 4 above a multiple of 5, and so forth. These small
approximate divisors are not solutions, and so we need a way to specify which
is the number p. The size of p is also assumed to be known, at  bits, as is
the fact that p is odd in the given cryptosystem.
2.4.1 Example
Let p = 15, so that  = 4, and let  = 3. These values for  and  are
too small to be secure, but they work well for illustrative purposes. With
these, let the public key be the three values 37 = 2  15 + 7, 65 = 4  15 + 5
and 107 = 7  15 + 2. The approximate gcd problem in this case is to nd
an odd integer p0 such that k1p
0  37 < k1p0 + 8, k2p0  65 < k2p0 + 8 and
k3p
0  107 < k3p0 + 8. That is, each of the three public values is less than 8
above a multiple of p0. The actual value of p = 15 satises this; the numbers
3 and 5 both almost do as well, being factors of 15, but are excluded by the
size requirement. In fact, any factor of p is shorter than p and would be so
excluded, no matter the value of p.
Attempting to brute force every possible noise values for any pair and then
using a fast technique to nd the gcd will always return p, but this takes
exponential time in , and may not return p as a unique answer. Likewise,
attempting to brute force every -bit possibility for p is exponential in , so
the public key is resistant to both types of brute force.
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Chapter 3
Integer Lattices
Lattices provide a method for combining the power of linear algebra with the
discrete settings of number theory, and can provide tools for working with
long lists of integers at once. We study them briey here because lattice-based
attacks are among the most promising methods of breaking the approximate
gcd problem on which the security of the private key rests.
3.1 Properties
Denition 3 (Lattice). A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rn, usually one
which spans Rn. That is, a lattice is the set of all integral linear combinations
of a set B of linearly independent basis vectors in Rn, similar to how a real
vector space is the set of all real linear combinations of a set of basis vectors.
The number of elements in the basis for a lattice L is called the dimension
of L.
Conceptually, a lattice reduces the real vector space Rn into an integer-based
analogue. A lattice is dened in a manner very similar to a vector space; the
only dierence is that only integer scalar multiples of vectors are allowed,
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rather than arbitrary real number scalar multiples. Readers with more expe-
rience with algebra will note that a lattice is an instance of a Z-module.
Note that the denition of a lattice restricts the scalars that lattice vec-
tors may be multiplied by to the integers; the individual lattice elements
are themselves not constrained to having integer coordinates, that is, being
elements of Zn. The lattice itself will be a subset of Zn if and only if every
basis vector is an element of Zn.
One of the simplest lattices is the one spanned by the standard basis vectors
e1 = [ 10 ] and e2 = [
0
1 ], which turns out to be a square lattice, as seen in gure
3.1.
e1
e2
Figure 3.1: Square Lattice Spanned by e1 and e2
3.1.1 Dierent Bases
As described above, an n-dimensional lattice is generated from a basis of
n vectors in a manner similar to generating an n-dimensional vector space.
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However, the choice of basis is far more important than generating a real
vector space. For elements of Rn, there is only one n-dimensional vector
space that can be generated; any n linearly independent vectors form a basis
for the space Rn. The only dierence between bases are their convenience for
use.
Lattices, on the other hand, are very dependent on the basis used. Figure 3.2
shows how a simple rotation of one basis vector can dramatically alter the
nature of the lattice. However, there is no single, unique basis for a lattice.
Many dierent bases of vectors generate the same lattice. Figure 3.3 exhibits
two very dierent bases that both generate the same lattice.
(a) Square Lattice (b) Hexagonal Lattice
Figure 3.2: Lattices from Dierent Bases
In a real vector space V , any basis of V can be used to nd an orthogonal basis
of V , using a Gram-Schmidt or similar process. These basis vectors can all
be scaled to unit length to create an orthonormal basis. With lattices this is
not entirely possible: most lattices have no orthogonal basis to nd, and basis
vectors cannot be arbitrarily scaled. Instead, it is desirable to have a basis
for a given lattice whose elements are short and nearly orthogonal. Section
3.3 describes one technique for nding such bases and its use in attacking
the somewhat homomorphic scheme described in chapter 2.
The process of lattice reduction attempts not to create an orthonormal basis,
but instead the next best thing: a basis whose elements are as short and
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Figure 3.3: Two bases for a Lattice
as close to being orthogonal as possible. Finding the basis closest to being
orthogonal is an NP-complete problem; approximate solutions can be found
in polynomial time using a number of techniques, such as the LLL lattice
reduction algorithm described in section 3.3.
Dening the shortest or most orthogonal basis is itself an interesting problem.
The shortest can be taken to be the basis B that minimizes P
v2B
kvk, or it
can be the basis that minimizes minv2Bkvk. Orthogonality becomes a second
condition. For any basis B = fv1; : : : ;vng of a lattice L, the n-dimensional
volume of the parallelepiped formed by the basis vectors is a constant d(L)
that depends only on the lattice L itself. The product of the lengths of the
basis vectors is always greater than or equal to d(L), and is equal to d(L)
only if the basis is orthogonal. The ratio
(B) =
Q
v2B
kvk
d(L)
;
known as the orthogonality defect, measures how far from being orthogonal
the basis is, where  = 1 indicates the basis is orthogonal.
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3.2 Shortest Vector Problem
Lattices present a number of interesting and useful problems which are inter-
esting in their own right and provide solutions to number-theoretic problems.
One lattice problem of particular importance is the shortest vector problem
(SVP).
Denition 4 (Shortest Vector Problem). Given a lattice L, nd a nonzero
vector v 2 L such that for every nonzero vector u 2 L, kvk  kuk.
Note that the solution v to the SVP is not unique. In particular, if v is a
solution to the SVP for a given lattice, then so is  v; in the square lattice
shown in gure 3.1, the vectors e1; e1; e2; e2 are all valid solutions to the
SVP.
The shortest vector problem itself is known to be NP-hard. However, approx-
imate solutions can be found using a number of polynomial time algorithms.
Lattice reduction techniques exist for nding short, nearly orthogonal bases
in polynomial time. These methods can nd vectors within a xed constant
C of being the shortest vector in a lattice L, where C depends only on the
dimension of the lattice.
The shortest vector problem has serious implications for the security of the
integer-based cryptosystem. There are two basic steps for doing so. First, for
any integer xi in the public key, bxi=qic = p. Thus, recovering any qi would
allow an attacker to recover p. Next, note that the ratio yi = xi=x0 is very
close to the ratio qi=q0. Thus, the sequence of numbers fy1; y2; : : : ; ytg can
be approximated by the sequence fq1=q0; q2=q0; : : : ; qt=q0g. This problem of
approximating one sequence of numbers by a sequence of rational numbers,
all with the same bounded denominator q  N , is called simultaneous Dio-
phantine approximation (SDA). J. C. Lagarias presents in [13] a method of
solving instances of SDA using the LLL algorithm to nd a short vector of
a specic lattice. We apply his method to the sequence fy1; y2; : : : ; ytg as an
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attempt to recover the denominator q0, which we then use to recover p. Sec-
tion 3.3 describes the LLL algorithm in more detail and section 3.4 describes
its use in the SDA problem; our implementation and its results are discussed
in chapter 5.
3.3 LLL Reduction
In 1982, Arjen Lenstra, Hendrik Lenstra and Laszlo Lovasz introduced a
method of lattice reduction which runs in polynomial time [14]. This algo-
rithm is known as the LLL algorithm after the creators' initials. As with all
lattice reduction algorithms, LLL takes as input a basis for a lattice, typically
as given by a matrix whose rows are the basis elements. It transforms this
basis into a new basis for the same lattice, where the resulting basis is both
shorter and more orthogonal than the original. The act of nding the most
optimal basis is NP-hard; the LLL algorithm is an approximation algorithm,
and so becomes polynomial time by only nding a basis within some known
distance of the optimal basis.
Consider the lattice L with the basis B = fb1;b2; : : : ;bng. The rst step
in LLL basis reduction to form the orthogonal basis B = fb1;b2; : : : ;bng
using the Gram-Schmidt process. Then, dene a set of scalars i;j =
bi bj
bj bj
.
A basis is said to be LLL reduced if two conditions are met:
Size Condition
ji;jj =
jvi vj j
kvjk2
 1
2
for all 1  j < i  n:
Lovasz Condition
kvi k2 
 
   2i;i 1
 kvi 1k2 for all  i  n:
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The size condition ensures that the reduced basis is small, while the Lovasz
condition ensures the basis is close to being orthogonal. The parameter  is
typically taken to be 3=4, though it can be take any value such that 1=4 <
 < 1; if  = 1 then the LLL algorithm is still dened, though at this point it
no longer runs in polynomial time. In general, higher values of  take longer
to run but produce more accurate results. The LLL algorithm produces a
lattice basis that satises both conditions.
After the Gram-Schmidt basis is determined, we work on one vector bk of the
basis B at a time, starting with b2. The size of bk is reduced by subtracting
close integer multiples of bj for each j < k, that is, the Gram-Schmidt vectors
corresponding to those lattice vectors that have already been reduced. Then
if bk satises the Lovasz condition, move on to the next vector, if not then
swap it with the previous vector and move back to vector bk 1. Note that
bk 1 is now the vector that was just reduced as bk. Note that if b2 is the
current vector, so that the vectors b1 and b2 were swapped, the reduction is
resumed with the new vector b2 rather than the new b1. Algorithm 1 presents
the LLL algorithm as well, in an easier manner to implement it from than this
prose description. Note that the order of the basis vectors b1; : : : ;bn aects
the algorithm, so reordering the basis B can change the resulting basis.
3.3.1 Example
The LLL algorithm is fairly abstract, and so may not be easily understood
at rst. Therefore, a concrete example for illustrative purposes presents itself
as a good idea. We present the example using the usual value of  = 3=4.
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Input : A basis B = fb1; : : : ;bng for a lattice L.
Output: A basis B = fb1; : : : ;bng for the lattice L satisfying the Size and
Lovasz conditions
Set k = 2
Set b1 = b1
while k  n do
Recalculate b1; : : : ;b

k and i;j by using Gram-Schmidt on b1; : : : ;bk
for j = 1; 2; : : : ; k   1 do
// Size Reduction
Set bk = bk   bk;jevj
end
// Lovasz Condition
if kbkk2 
 
   2k;k 1
 kbk 1k2 then
Set k = k + 1
else
// Swap Step
Swap bk 1 and bk
Set k = max(k   1; 2)
end
end
Return LLL reduced basis fb1; : : : ;bng
Algorithm 1: LLL Lattice Basis Reduction
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Consider the lattice L spanned by the rows of the matrix
B =
2
64
1 1 1
0  2 4
3 4  2
3
75 :
Applying Gram-Schmidt gives the orthogonal basis given by the rows of
B =
2
64
1 1 1
 2=3  8=3 10=3
11=30  23=15 7=6
3
75
with the values 2;1 = 2=3; 3;1 = 5=3; 3;2 =  29=20.
We start the reduction with k = 2. We take b2 =
h
0  2 4
i
and replace it
with b2   b2;1eb1. Since 2;1 rounds to 1, b2 becomes
h
 1  3 3
i
. Then
we recalculate b1;b

2 and 2;1, and compare kb2k to kb1k. Since kb2k2 
(3=4   22;1)kb1k2, we continue to k = 3.
Now we replace b3 with b3 b3;1eb1 b3;2eb2. That is, b3 2b1+b2. This
turns b3 into
h
1 0 0
i
. Again, we compare kb3k to kb2k. Then we must
reapply Gram-Schmidt to our current version of B once again. At this point,
B =
2
64
1 1 1
 1  3 3
1 0 0
3
75
In this case, the row
h
1 0 0
i
will fail the Lovasz condition and be swapped
with the second row. Then we turn our attention to the row
h
1 0 0
i
as the
new second row. It will again fail the Lovasz condition and be swapped with
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the rst row. At this point, we now have
B =
2
64
1 0 0
1 1 1
 1  3 3
3
75 :
Then size reducing b2 once more turns it into
h
0 1 1
i
, which passes the
Lovasz condition. Thus, we pass on to the last row. We apply one last size
reduction, which turns the basis matrix into
B =
2
64
1 0 0
0 1 1
0  3 3
3
75 :
At this point, the nal row passes the Lovasz condition, so we terminate the
algorithm.
3.4 LLL Attack
The LLL attack uses has at its heart the LLL algorithm for lattice reduc-
tion. Lagarias' method for solving an instance of simultaneous Diophantine
approximation involves forming a lattice based on the numbers to be approx-
imated and the bound N on the approximation denominator. Then the LLL
algorithm is applied to the lattice to nd a new basis of short vectors, with
the shortest basis vector being taken as an approximate shortest vector. The
entries of this vector are related to the approximations fq1=q0; : : : ; qt=q0g.
Note that an attacker can disregard integers from the public key other than
x0; this has the eect of attacking a smaller, but still valid, public key. At-
tacking a smaller key is faster, but more sensitive to noise and thus less likely
to correctly retrieve the private key.
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Lagarias builds his lattice to be reduced as follows: Let fa1=b1; a2=b2; : : : ; at=btg
be the list of numbers to approximate. The approximations are a list of ra-
tional numbers all with denominator q. Let B = b1b2    ; using the Lagarias
technique as an attack on the integer cryptosystem has ai = xi and bi = x0
for every 1  i  t so that B = xt0. Let N be the desired upper bound on the
denominator q. In the attack, the attacker wishes to recover q = q0. Since p
is  bits long and x0  q0p is  bits long, q0 is bounded above by 2 , so let
N = 2 . Then take the lattice spanned by the rows of the matrix
M 0 =
2
6666666664
NB 0 0    0
0 NB 0    0
0 0 NB    0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    NB 0
NB a1
b1
NB a2
b2
   NB at
bt
2+ 
3
7777777775
=
2
6666666664
2 xt0 0 0    0
0 2 xt0 0    0
0 0 2 xt0    0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    2 xt0 0
2 xt 10 x1 2
 xt 10 x2    2 xt 10 xt 2+ 
3
7777777775
:
The algorithm as described by Lagarias uses 2j and iterates over j; however,
in our case the length of the desired solution q0 is already known to be  .
Specically, we have xi=x0 = (qi + si)=q0 where the error term si  2. That
is, q0xi = qix0 + six0. The new error term six0 is approximately 2
+ ; the
appearance of this value in M 0 is not completely arbitrary.
Reducing every row of M by the constant 2 xt 10 gives a new lattice con-
taining the lattice spanned by the rows of M 0, so the target solution still
exists in the new lattice. Then, rearranging the basis vectors and reordering
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the dimensions of the lattice have no eect on the lattice itself, and can be
expressed by permuting the rows and columns of the basis matrix. Lastly, any
basis element can be replaced with its negation without eecting the lattice,
so the LLL reduction can therefore be performed on the lattice corresponding
to the new matrix
M =
2
66666664
2 x1 x2    xt
 x0
 x0
. . .
 x0
3
77777775
:
The target solution to the SDA of q1=q0; q2=q0; : : : ; qt=q0 corresponds to the
vector v = hq0; q1; : : : ; qti M = hq02; q0x1   q1x0; : : : ; q0xt   qtx0i, which
has length approximately 2+ 
p
t + 1. The smaller the value of t, the more
ecient the method, though the accuracy decreases as well; small values of t
increase the probability that vectors smaller than the target v, obscuring v.
Conversely, as t grows, the probability that v is the vector found grows, as
does the computation time required to nd it.
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Chapter 4
Cryptosystem Implementation
The theoretical background above describes the creation of a fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme. Now we take a look at the issue of implementing
the system, including performance results. Currently, the performance of the
system is the largest obstacle to its success; we examine some parameter
adjustments to improve this situation.
4.1 Implementation Details
All programs used to implement and test the fully homomorphic encryption
system for this paper were compiled and run on a single laptop computer.
The programs had approximately 3GiB of memory available and ran on a
64-bit processor; no eort was made to use multiple cores.
The implementation programs were written in C++ and compiled using gcc
version 4.5. The code may be downloaded from the RIT Digital Media Li-
brary. You may use and modify according to the terms of the GNU General
Public License version 2, available with the code, or any later version at your
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option. Compiling and running the code yourself requires the GNU Multi-
precision (GMP) library and Number Theory Library (NTL) for the numeric
computations as well as the GNU longopts library.
The core of the implementation is the le homomorphic.cpp with its asso-
ciated header le homomorphic.h. The les keygen.cpp, encrypt.cpp and
decrypt.cpp provide simple command-line programs for using the function-
ality that homomorphic.cpp provides. The le compare-png.cpp homomor-
phically evaluates whether an encrypted input is a PNG format image; this
serves as a simple reference for the system's performance and demonstrates
its correctness. Lastly, the le lll.cpp implements the LLL-based attack
described in chapter 5.
4.2 Suggested Parameters
Consider the various complexities of the integer based system relative to
the various denable parameters. For now, we shall keep things simpler by
deferring discussion of the complexity bootstrapping adds to section 6.2. A
single freshly encrypted ciphertext, corresponding to a single bit plaintext,
is  bits long. A single element of the public key is as well; since there are
fi + 1 such elements, the public key is O(fi) bits in size. Thus, the values of
fi and especially  dominate the size complexity of the system.
Recall as seen in table 2.1 that the suggested values of  and fi are  = ~O(5)
and fi =  + . This gives that a single bit plaintext is encrypted by a
ciphertext of size ~O(5) bits and the public key has size ~O(10) bits. For a
moderately small security level  = 64 = 26, this gives ciphertexts on the
order of 128MiB and a public key of 128PiB. These are far too large for
everyday use, and attempting to store the public key itself requires around
one million dollars worth of hard drives when using consumer-grade products.
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Even a trivially weak setting of  = 8 gives ciphertexts of 4KiB and a public
key of 128MiB. This is at least computationally manageable, though com-
pletely insecure and still larger than desired. A summary of key generation
tests involving the default parameters is provided in table 4.1. Note that an
attempt to raise  to 16 with these settings wrote approximately 15GiB to
disk after one hour, but was unable to nish key generation. Every test with
a larger value for  crashed after running out of memory.
 Time Taken (s) Public Key Size (MiB)
2 2 0:15
4 0:4 4:7
8 60 474
Table 4.1: Key generation with default  and fi
4.3 Relaxed Parameters
The size of the integers involved is the primary issue with the eciency of
the partially homomorphic encryption scheme. Decreasing the values of some
of the parameters given in table 2.1 can lower the work required to use the
system; this reduction must be made carefully so as to preserve the security
of the system. The size of the public key is O(fi) and the size of a ciphertext
corresponding to a one-bit plaintext is O(). Thus, we focus primarily on the
value of .
4.3.1 Relaxing 
The values suggested by van Dijk et al. give  = ~O(5) and fi = +, so that
the message expansion is ~O(5), and the size of the public key is ~O(10) bits.
As an extreme attempt at reduction, we set  = 2:5. Note that  must be
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at least ~O(2) to allow bootstrapping, and each xi = qip+ ri must be longer
than p, a value of  = 2:5 approaches the limits of correct computation of
the system. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the results of this relaxation on
performance.
  fi Time Taken (s) Public Key (MiB)
16 1024 1040 0:364 4.2
64 32768 32832 86:795 386
256 1048576 2048 707:162 625
Table 4.2: Relaxed  key generation
As table 4.2 shows, the reduction of  to 2:5 has a dramatic eect on the
complexity of the cryptosystem. Compared to the case  = 8 with the sug-
gested value of  = 5, the relaxed parameters achieve a smaller key size in
only double the time, while nominally multiplying the security parameter by
eight. For the case where  = 256, the key size was still prohibitively large,
so fi was decreased further than the reduction in  alone would bring it. Of
course, increasing the value of  is meaningless if the actual security of the
system is decreased by relaxing .
Plaintext Ciphertext Encryption Decryption
 Size (B) Size (KiB) Time (s) Time (ms)
16 29 72:891 0:057 18:5
16 40 99:617 0:072 24:0
16 238 580:70 0:346 70:0
64 29 2312:8 0:390 258:9
64 40 3160:8 21:344 348:0
64 238 18425:2 134:869 1879:6
Table 4.3: Relaxed  encryption and decryption
The performance of both the encryption and decryption algorithms is rea-
sonably fast. Both are roughly linear with respect to the input size, taking
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approximately half of a second to encrypt each byte at security  = 64, and
less than a tenth of a second to decrypt the corresponding ciphertexts. Note
that while table 4.2 lists the results of individual key generations, the re-
sults in table 4.3 are the averages over eight trials for each plaintext at each
security level.
Unfortunately, the results of the encryption are not entirely good ones. Though
the time taken is fairly small, the resulting ciphertexts are not. At the level
of  = 64, each ciphertext requires approximately 80KiB for every byte of
plaintext; the expansion ratio is around 80000. Part of this is due to the
implementation. For portability and code simplicity, a ciphertext c is output
in ASCII using the base 10 representation of c. That is, a single digit of c
takes a byte of output. On average, a decimal digit encodes log2 10 = 3:3 bits,
so 3:3 bits are encoded by 8 bits. Thus, the most ecient encoding of the
ciphertext c would be approximately half the size it currently is. However,
a ciphertext c is a  bit number before encoding, so the expansion ratio for
the cryptosystem is at a minimum .
As seen before, the value  = 2:5 is approaching the minimum possible value
of , so ciphertexts cannot be made much smaller without some way to bypass
either the bound of  on expansion or the current value of , which would
allow further reduction of . As a small side topic, [21] mentions a method
of compressing the ciphertexts output by this system in a way that they
can still be correctly decrypted. However, doing so renders the compressed
ciphertexts useless for the fully homomorphic encryption, so that it is only
practical for reducing transmission costs of an encrypted computation result.
Furthermore, the technique for bootstrapping increases the size of the result-
ing ciphertexts even more. Above the small size of the plaintexts tested, the
storage requirements to use the integer based system become prohibitively
large.
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4.3.2 Relaxing fi
Relaxing  in section 4.3.1 leads to impressive gains in performance; unfortu-
nately, it is not necessarily secure. The high value suggested for  is designed
to make the system resistant to lattice-based attacks on the public key. Next
we relax fi , in the hope that the possible security implications are less severe
than those of relaxing , though at the cost of less performance gains. Recall
that the suggested value of fi depends on the value of , so that reducing
the value of  will reduce the numerical value of fi . This is not considered a
reduction of fi . Note that  and fi may be relaxed simultaneously for even
higher performance gains if the resulting security implications are considered
acceptable.
The rst security implication of relaxing fi is on the subset sum problem.
Since breaking a known ciphertext can be reduced to an instance of the subset
sum problem with fi elements, requiring exponential resources to break the
system requires that fi  
(). This provides a simple lower bound on fi , but
does not guarantee complete security on its own.
The other aspect to consider is the role of fi in security of the approximate gcd
problem. Reducing fi cannot reduce an attacker's resources required to attack
the approximate gcd: even though reducing the dimension of the lattice used
in the LLL attack reduces the time taken, the attacker is always able to ignore
elements of the public key anyway. Thus, reducing fi in no way improves the
attacker's ability to do so; if anything, it forces the attacker to settle for the
lower accuracy of the faster attack instead of being able to choose the balance
between speed and accuracy.
The other concern for fi and the approximate gcd is not the diculty of the
approximate gcd itself. Rather, it is the relative diculty of attacking the
system using the approximate gcd. As a consequence of the leftover hash
lemma, van Dijk et al. show that the approximate gcd is the \easiest" attack
41
against the integer based system, in the sense that any attack against the
system can be used to nd a fast solution to the approximate gcd problem.
This result holds when fi  +!(log ). Reducing fi below this simply inval-
idates the proof of this result. Even if the approximate gcd is no longer the
easiest attack, there is no alternative attack vector suggested. Thus, reducing
fi only provides a theoretical possibility that a new attack exists; this new
attack is not known at this time, nor is its existence even guaranteed.
As seen above, reducing fi appears to be relatively safe. Using fi =  as a
lower bound imposed by the subset sum problem, there are no glaring security
holes from reducing fi below the suggested  + . Thus, we take fi =  as
an extreme case for the relaxation of fi . Table 4.4 lists the results of key
generation using the relaxed fi . Compare these to the results for reducing 
in table 4.2. In the small case,  = 16, the time taken is around ten times
that taken for the  relaxation, though this remains quite small. The public
key also increases slightly, though we expect that using  = 3 instead of
   2:5 would have keys the same size as the fi =  reduction.
  fi Time Taken (s) Public Key (MiB)
16 1383604 16 2:454 6.9
16 1383604 16 3:646 6.9
16 1383604 16 16:801 6.9
16 1383604 16 2:456 6.9
16 1383604 16 3:699 6.9
16 1383604 16 1:280 6.9
16 1383604 16 8:474 6.9
Table 4.4: Relaxed fi key generation
Unfortunately, as the security parameter grows past  = 64, the time required
to generate a key is very long. In our tests, the full value of  = 5 = 230
required slightly over half an hour to generate each integer of the public key;
generating even the reduced number fi = 64 integers would require over one
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full day. Unfortunately, while relaxing fi does indeed speed up key generation
slightly, it does not do so well enough to scale to secure levels.
From this the next step is to examine how keys constructed using a relaxed 
value withstand attacks. We have shown that relaxing  can bring the time
required by the system to manageable levels, though further improvement is
of course welcome; relaxing fi would appear to have fewer security concerns
for the system, but is unable to provide sucient performance gains to be
viable. Even with the size reduction aorded by relaxing , the size of both
keys and ciphertexts is very large; if the system retains security under the
relaxation, however, it may be possible to modify the system somehow to
obtain viable ciphertext sizes.
43
Chapter 5
LLL-Based Attack
Here we describe our implementation of the LLL based attack described
in section 3.4. The attack implementation was carried out under the same
hardware and operating environment as the implementation of the system
itself | see the beginning of chapter 4. Additionally, the Number Theory
Library (NTL) was used for the implementation of the LLL algorithm itself;
the GNU Multiprecision Library was again used as the backend for handling
the individual arithmetic operations.
5.1 Attack Success
There are two main aspects to the success of using the LLL algorithm to
attack this system: whether the attacks works or doesn't, and the time it
takes in doing so. For the case of attacking the cryptosystem, these two goals
are in opposition to a degree. The LLL attack attempts to retrieve the value
of the private key p from a collection fxigti=0 of the public key integers.
Increasing t uses more of the public key integers, meaning more information
is used to extract p; this results in a more accurate attack, but at the cost of
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increased time taken.
Consider the time complexity of using the LLL algorithm in attacking the
given cryptosystem. Suppose that we have a d-dimensional lattice embedded
in n-dimensional space, and the longest of these vectors has length B under
the standard Euclidean norm. Then the running time of the LLL algorithm
is O(d5n log3B). Recall that in using LLL reduction to attack the public key,
we construct the (t + 1)  (t + 1) matrix
M =
2
66666664
2 x1 x2    xt
 x0
 x0
. . .
 x0
3
77777775
Then the lattice spanned by the rows of M is spanned by t + 1 vectors,
each with t + 1 elements. Because of this, d = n = t + 1. The longest
vector in the given basis is the rst row, b0 = h2; x1; x2; : : : ; xti. Each xi is
approximately 2, so that kb0k 
p
22 + t22  2pt. Thus, the running
time of the LLL lattice reduction against the cryptosystem is O(3t6 log3 t).
This is polynomial time, but even for the case of  = 3 the complexity is
O(9) for any xed t.
5.1.1 Relaxed 
The recommended value for  is at least ~O(5). At this level, the attack takes
approximately 11 hours to run on the relatively small values  = 16 and t = 5.
This low value of t severely impacts the accuracy of the attack, resulting in
the \key" recovered being about 800 times longer than the actual secret key.
At this level of , improving the accuracy by increasing t quickly consumes
prohibitively large amounts of memory; section 5.2 explores these memory
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usage issues in greater detail. The issue at hand is whether or not reducing
the value of  to around 3 is enough to make the attack practical. Since it
allows an attacker to use a larger value for t while using comprable time and
space, the attacker should be able to increase their accuracy somewhat.
Relaxing the value of  does indeed speed up the attack, as expected. Even
when increasing  up to 64, the overall value of  is reduced by a factor of 4
over the full strength test described above, with  = 16 and  = 5. Retaining
the small value of t = 5 cut the running time immensely, from around 11
hours to less than 10 minutes; this would seem to make an attacker's job
easier. However, the accuracy of the attack is important as well.
In the case where  = 16 and  = 5, the LLL algorithm recovers a number
much larger than the private key. With the reduced , this attack still recovers
an overly large key, though the recovered key is only about 7 times as long
rather than the massive disparity seen with the unrelaxed key. However, an
attacker is free to use a higher value of t; the low initial times with low
t values means that raising t can be somewhat practical. Of course, the
running time is still O(t6 log3 t) for any xed value of  so the time taken by
using more vectors in the attack grows fairly rapidly. The time complexity
is subexponential, but a casual attacker will likely be put o by the time
required by the LLL algorithm. Increasing t from 5 to 8, a small change on
its own, already brings the running time of the attack to over an hour, with
only slight improvement in accuracy.
5.2 Memory Usage
The LLL-based attack has a secondary cost, other than the time taken to
run. The amount of memory the attack uses is large as well. Again, the attack
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works by reducing the lattice basis dened by the rows of the matrix
M =
2
66666664
2 x1 x2    xt
 x0
 x0
. . .
 x0
3
77777775
and each xi is  bits long. Then, the individual entries of the matrix require
a minimum of 2t +  bits to store; the use of signed integers increases this
requirement, as does the overhead of storing the elements as a matrix. For
the parameters we study most,  = 64 and  = 3 = 218, this puts the
memory requirements around (64t)KiB, just to store the matrix M . For the
full value of  = 5, storing M requires about tGiB, though reducing  to
16 reduces this to approximately the same level as  = 64 under the relaxed
 condition.
There is more to the memory usage than simply storing M like this. One issue
is that the large values of the individual matrix elements typically require a
degree of overhead to store, inating the size requirements. More importantly,
the original matrix M is very sparse, while performing the basis reduction
does not necessarily preserve this sparseness. The memory required to store
M is linear in t; the memory required to store a full matrix of the same size
is quadratic in t. Lastly, these calculations only apply to the storage of a
single matrix. The actual running of the LLL algorithm requires more space
of the individual operations used, which pushes the costs up even farther. At
the modest level of  = 64, testing t = 16 used about 10MiB. This is small
usage on modern machines, but is ten times the memory required to simply
store M at that level, and the 16 integers used from the public key represent
a tiny portion of the 262208 available in the same key. Thus, the memory
usage provides a strong limit on how high an attacker can make t, trading
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o speed for accuracy; the number fi of integers in the public key oers only
a much weaker bound on t.
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Chapter 6
Homomorphic Computation on
Ciphertexts
The preceding chapters discussed the general practicality of the integer-based
somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem. However, since this system is being
used to create a fully homomorphic system, its performance for homomorphi-
cally evaluating functions should be examined as well. This falls under two
broad headings: the system's performance when evaluating a small Boolean
circuit, and the system's performance when performing a single bootstrap-
ping cycle. Since an arbitrary circuit is made by joining smaller circuits using
bootstrapping, both have an eect on the overall performance of the system.
6.1 Evaluation
The running time of evaluation of a Boolean circuit C depends on the circuit
itself, as well as the size of the ciphertexts involved. Recall that the result of
adding two numbers is as long as the longer of the two summands, with a
possible carry bit; multiplying two numbers results in a product whose length
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is the sum of the lengths of the factors. Thus, the output of each addition or
multiplication gate in C is O() bits long, as the input to each one is O()
bits long.
The GMP library we used for computation achieves addition of two numbers
in linear time, while a variety of multiplication algorithms are used by the li-
brary: larger inputs use more asymptotically ecient algorithms as the input
reaches certain thresholds. As  grows very large, the Toom 4-way algorithm
used approaches O(1:404). From this, the time taken to evaluate is domi-
nated by the multiplication gates in C, for an overall runtime of O(M1:404),
where M is the number of multiplication gates in the circuit C.
6.1.1 Bitstring Comparison
We measure the performance of the evaluation with a straightforward test
circuit. Files in the PNG format for images start with a well-dened constant
header 64 bits long. Comparing the rst 64 bits of a le to this header has a
simple conversion to a Boolean circuit expressed using our allowed operations
of AND and XOR. Let m1;m2; : : : ;m64 be the rst 64 bits of a plaintext le,
and let h1; h2; : : : ; h64 be the 64 bits of the PNG header. Then the le has
the PNG header if and only if mi = hi for every 1  i  64.
We can express this condition using the allowed Boolean operations as fol-
lows: mi = hi if mi  hi = 0. Equivalently, mi = hi if mi  hi  1 = 1.
Since the hi are public and constant, we can negate them and input those
negations into the comparison circuit; then mi = hi if mi  hi = 1. Since
matching the header occurs when this holds for every index i, we have
64^
i=1
 
mi  hi

=
8<
:1 PNG header present,0 PNG header absent. (6.1)
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Since this equation uses only the operations of AND and XOR, it can be
directly converted into a corresponding equation involving ciphertexts:
64Y
i=1
E (mi) + hi =
8<
:E (1) PNG header present,E (0) PNG header absent. (6.2)
Note that there is no need to encrypt the value of hi before evaluating equa-
tion (6.2). Since the values of hi are publicly documented, an attacker would
already know them. Encrypting them adds no security, and a plaintext works
as an encryption of itself for purposes of evaluation. Therefore we forego the
extra overhead for encrypting them and operate directly on the plaintext
hi. We tested this 63 multiplication circuit on ciphertexts corresponding en-
crypted using  = 64;  = 3. The entire circuit was correctly evaluated
without bootstrapping in approximately 15 minutes.
6.2 Bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is Craig Gentry's very powerful contribution to fully homo-
morphic encryption. The bootstrapping technique allows us to convert a
somewhat homomorphic system capable of only a bounded number of op-
erations, such as the integer based system given by van Dijk et al, into a
fully homomorphic system. Since the purpose of this somewhat homomor-
phic system is to be used as a bootstrappable system, a full investigation of
the system's eciency requires bootstrapping the system be looked at.
6.2.1 Key Modication
Bootstrapping the integer based system rst requires supplementing the pub-
lic key with a \hint" to the private key. Without this hint, the decryption
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function winds up being a constant multiple too large to evaluate homomor-
phically; adding the hint eectively \squashes" the decryption routine to a
small enough size to be correctly evaluated. A bootstrappable public key
adds to a normal public key fxigfii=0 a set of  rational numbers fyigi=1, each
in the interval [0; 2) and with  bits of precision. The generation of these yi is
done in such a way that a sparse subset of cardinality  exists whose sum is
related to the original public key p. See table 2.1 for a summary of these new
parameters in relation to the system parameters not used in bootstrapping.
The sparse subset of fyig can be used as a private key, and can be encoded
in a way that makes it easily encrypted. Overall, the public key has its size
increased by O() bits; with the relaxation  = 3 this becomes O(9), so
the public key increases in size from O(6) to O(9). The new private key is
represented as a vector of  bits, where the ith bit is 1 if yi is in the sparse
subset. Then the bootstrappable private key is O() = O(5) bits long.
The key augmentation itself takes a nontrivial time to complete. At the level
 = 16, the process takes slightly under 5 minutes. Unfortunately, this se-
curity level is far too low for our purposes: for the purposes of this test, we
desire a security parameter of at least  = 64. At this level, bootstrapping is
fairly unusable for members of the general public. Six hours worth of compu-
tation was not enough to create even 2% of the set fyig. At this rate, creating
a full bootstrappable key takes between one and two weeks of computation
time.
6.2.2 Recryption
The heart of bootstrapping is the ability to recrypt ciphertexts: by homomor-
phically evaluating the decryption algorithm, a ciphertext is transformed into
a dierent ciphertext corresponding to the same plaintext. The result of re-
cryption is a reduction of the noise in a ciphertext so that it may be further
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used in a Boolean circuit. Unfortunately, the process is far from ecient.
Martin van Dijk and his team adapted a technique from Gentry's work in
[8] and used it to prove an upper bound on the complexity of decryption.
Specically, they show that using the information generated for bootstrap-
ping allows decryption by a polynomial of degree at most 128 log2 . With
the values  64;  = 3 as explored above, this involves almost 300 thousand
multiplications. Recall that the PNG header comparison has 63 multiplica-
tions, and took approximately 15 minutes at this security level. If the time
taken is directly proportional to the polynomial degree, then this takes over
1.5 months worth of computation time.
Of course, this is not feasible to carry out for a John Doe using consumer
grade hardware; even for a dedicated cluster or supercomputer this repre-
sents a signicant drain on resources. Recall that this time represents only
a single bootstrapping operation. The choice of  is such that a bootstrap-
ping cycle must be done for nearly every basic operation in a circuit C to be
computed, if C is not small enough to be evaluated on its own. Increasing 
would allow for more operations to be done in each bootstrapping cycle, as
well as allowing for larger circuits to be evaluated without bootstrapping, but
would require increasing  as well. A circuit large enough to require boot-
strapping could take thousands of years worth of computing time. Without a
massively parallel computer system, this cryptosystem cannot be eciently
bootstrapped.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Results Summary
The results of our test were mixed. The integer-based system on its own takes
too much time and space to be used at any signicant level of security. This
was the primary motivation for attempting to relax . Relaxing  did reduce
the time taken for the system to generate keys and to encrypt data down to
viable levels. It even did so while retaining decent security; the sizes involved
kept the LLL-based attack from compromising the system without massive
amounts of processing time.
Unfortunately, the rest of the results were rather poor. While key generation
and encryption had their times reduced to manageable levels by relaxing ,
the size of the resulting keys and ciphertexts is still excessively high. Further-
more, the time taken to homomorphically evaluate functions on ciphertexts
is also high. Very simple circuits can be evaluated quickly, but as the function
to evaluate grows in complexity, it becomes infeasible; circuits large enough
to require bootstrapping become intractable.
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7.2 Future Direction
While the results we obtained were less than promising, the somewhat ho-
momorphic system is not entirely worthless. At the very least, it provides
a simple introduction to the concept of fully homomorphic encryption and
bootstrapping for classroom settings. Some of the issues are possibly address-
able as well. Implementing some form of block encryption could possibly re-
duce the size of ciphertexts and the complexity of homomorphic evaluation.
Also, improving the eciency of homomorphic decryption, that is, refreshing
ciphertexts, provides another possibility for improving the overall system.
Since the value of  depends on the complexity of the homomorphic de-
cryption algorithm, improving that complexity allows for a reduction of ,
allowing  to be further reduced.
Improving the underlying system in one of these ways is likely to be dicult.
A dierent approach is to work on a dierent underlying system to bootstrap.
Gentry's original lattice-based system shows more promise in this regard. As
presented, Gentry's lattice system is already more ecient than the integer
system.
7.3 Final Remarks
The integer-based somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem presents itself as
a good proof of concept and educational tool. At this point it fails to be a
viable method of fully homomorphic encryption. Our results show that it can
be improved, but we fail to improve it to the point of practicality. It may be
possible to improve the system further; even if such improvements are not
found, the system remains interesting from a theoretical point of view.
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